CONFRONTING DAMASCUS: U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE EVOLVING SITUATION IN SYRIA, PART II

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CONFRONTING DAMASCUS: U.S. POLICY TOWARD
THE EVOLVING SITUATION IN SYRIA, PART II

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATRH]S

ONE HUNDRED TWELETH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 25, 2012

Serial No. 112-146

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

RON PAUL, Texas

MIKE PENCE, Indiana

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

CONNIE MACK, Florida

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas

TED POE, Texas

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio

DAVID RIVERA, Florida

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina

ROBERT TURNER, New York

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa

BRAD SHERMAN, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
DENNIS CARDOZA, California
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
KAREN BASS, California
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island

Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman

MIKE PENCE, Indiana
JOE WILSON, South Carolina

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
CONNIE MACK, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
GUS M. BILIRA KI S, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
ROBERT TURNER, New York

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
DENNIS CARDOZA, California
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

WITNESSES

Mr. Andrew Tabler, Next Generation Eellow, Washington Institute for Near

East Policy 6

Ms. Mara E. Karlin, instructor in strategic studies, School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies, Johns Hopkins University 12

Marc Lynch, Ph.D., professor of political science, director of Institute for
Middle East Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Wash-
ington University 17

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

Mr. Andrew Tabler: Prepared statement 8

Ms. Mara E. Karlin: Prepared statement 14

Marc Lynch, Ph.D.: Prepared statement 19

APPENDIX

Hearing notice 42

Hearing minutes 43

(III)

CONFRONTING DAMASCUS: U.S. POLICY TO-
WARD THE EVOLVING SITUATION IN SYRIA,
PART II

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2012

House of Representatives,

Subcommittee on the Middle East

AND South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in room
2360 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Chabot. The committee will come to order. Good afternoon,
everybody. Sorry for the change in location. Normally we are on
2172, but we had a bunch of hearings happening at the same time
so we are here in the Small Business Committee room this after-
noon. So sorry for any inconvenience to anyone.

I want to welcome all my colleagues to the hearing of the Sub-
committee on the Middle East and South Asia. As has been well
documented, the human rights abuses being perpetrated by the re-
gime in Damascus are simply horrifying. Recent reports suggest
that nearly 10,000 Syrian civilians have now died. Approximately
75,000 have fled the country and over 200,000 are internally dis-
placed within Syria itself

This is now the fourth hearing that this subcommittee has held
on Syrian human rights violations, and I am deeply saddened that
each time these numbers continue to grow by leaps and bounds.
What is more, the situation shows no sign of improving any time
soon. The English language does not have words strong enough to
adequately condemn the horrifying abuses that have been com-
mitted by the Assad regime and its allies against the Syrian peo-
ple.

Beyond questions of legitimacy, these despicable acts are proof
that the Assad regime is morally depraved, and it is my belief that
we and all other responsible nations have a moral imperative to en-
sure that Bashar al-Assad is removed from power as soon as pos-
sible.

Today’s hearing is being called to examine U.S. policy options to
address the continuing crisis. This subcommittee has had the privi-
lege of hearing testimony from Assistant Secretaries Feldman and
Posner as well as Frederic Hof, Special Coordinator for Regional
Affairs and one of the administration’s point people on Syria.

( 1 )

2

Although the administration has taken a number of steps on
Syria for which it deserves credit, I am deeply concerned that none
of these will actually lead to a resolution of the current crisis.
While the sanctions that have been implemented by the U.S. and
its allies around the world are certainly having an effect, I fear
they will not achieve the stated goal to actually bring about the re-
moval of Assad from power.

Some today are looking to Kofi Annan’s six-point plan for Syria,
the Assad regime’s recent acceptance of a ceasefire agreement and
the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 2042 and 2043 es-
tablishing an observer mission with optimism. I am afraid that I
do not share that optimism. Although diplomacy must always be
given an opportunity to succeed, I do not see one iota of evidence
to suggest that the Assad regime is sincere in any of its inter-
national commitments.

Recent reports reference satellite imagery which indicates that
the regime has not yet removed all heavy weaponry from popu-
lation centers in violation of the ceasefire agreement. If it con-
tinues, as it has for years, to shirk its international commitments
regarding its nuclear program, why should we expect it to honor
this agreement now? And if years of sanctions and international
isolation have not yet altered the Assad regime’s calculations, upon
what are we basing the hope that they will now when the regime
views itself as in a struggle for its very existence? Hope may be an
effective campaign catchphrase, but it is not an effective policy. In-
deed, we had all hoped for a clear path forward, that there might
be some way through a combination of pressure or enticements to
convince Assad to leave power. Those days are long gone.

I fear that those who are advocating for the Annan plan are
doing so not because they believe it has any chance of succeeding,
but because they do not want to make a far harder, even if nec-
essary, decision.

One lesson that this administration appears not to have learned
in over 3 years is that making no decision is, in fact, a decision in
and of itself. And the cost is real. As a former official recently
noted, “Suppose the administration had not sat on its thumbs and
had started delivering nonlethal aid 1 or 2 or 6 months ago. By
now we would, in fact, know a great deal more about the opposi-
tion, who is real and who has no military capacity, who can get
things into Syria and who can’t, who is corrupt and who is effec-
tive. That we know so little about the opposition is not so much an
intelligence failure as a deliberate policy.”

Our chief priority must be to get Assad out of power as soon as
possible. The longer Assad is allowed to stay in power, the greater
the number of innocents killed will be and the higher the likelihood
of the conflict evolving into a full-scale civil war will be. Further-
more, Assad’s removal would deal an important blow to the regime
and Tehran and the terrorists it funds, like Hezbollah.

As our witnesses will outline today, what remains before us are
a series of options that range, unfortunately, from bad to worse. As
we examine these options, however, we must not allow ourselves to
be deluded into thinking that Assad is something that he is not.
That he can be coaxed out of power or that he can lead any kind
of transition or reform process. He is beyond salvation.

3

I would now yield to the distinguished ranking member of the
subcommittee, Mr. Ackerman from New York, for 5 minutes.

Mr. Ackerman. I thank the very distinguished chairman. Atroc-
ities can provoke two kinds of errors from those who witness them.
The first is moral collapse, to look away and to refuse to see what
is before one’s eyes. Whether by impassivity or apathy or rational-
ization, the nonresponse to horror fails the test of moral responsi-
bility. Each of us, I suspect, has at some point walked away from
someone or something which made a claim on our heart. Likewise,
we as a government, and we as a nation, have sometimes failed to
live up to our own highest aspirations.

The second kind of failure is a form of reflex, a heedless leap into
the fire of need. Such acts of selflessness by individuals are often
properly understood as heroic, but in the life of nations they may
be extremely unwise. Promising to pay any price and bear any bur-
den sounds good on the East Lawn of the Capitol. I suspect those
words sound less appealing while trying to survive a night on pa-
trol in a Vietnamese jungle or an Iraqi slum. A man who jumps
into the freezing waters to save another may succeed, but as every
Boy Scout knows, it would be better to search for a pole or a rope
and to pull from solid ground. And indeed, once the leap is made
the would-be savior may quickly become a victim as well, doubling
the stakes of the crisis.

When this subcommittee met last year to consider the implica-
tions of the Syrian revolution, my fear was that we had fallen into
the trap of indifference and were seemingly heedless of both the
need of the people of Syria as well as the profound strategic impli-
cations in the potential collapse of the Assad dictatorship.

While innocent protestors’ blood was running in Syria’s streets.
State Department spokesmen were still rigidly calling for a “re-
straint on all sides.” A smarmy, condescending phrase that really
ought to be expunged from our Government’s lexicon, and it made
the Obama administration seem to be paralyzed. Behind the
scenes, however, and to their credit, the Obama administration was
working hard on developing the foundations for the broad, inter-
national consensus which exists today and has imposed unprece-
dented political, diplomatic and economic sanctions on the Assad
regime, that has opened contacts with the would-be successors to
the existing Syrian Government and that is continuing to support
the demand of the Syrian people to be free of Assad’s tyranny.

Today, I fear the pendulum is swinging toward the second and
more potentially dangerous error of precipitous action. I want to be
very clear. Profound moral outrage at what the Assad regime has
done is not an impediment or a failing. It is a bare requirement
for standing in the human race. But the loathing, contempt and
anger provoked by Assad’s atrocities are poor counselors and doubt-
ful policymakers.

As human beings we must be informed by what we have seen.
We cannot pretend to see these events as trivial or somehow nor-
mal. The butchery of thousands of men and women, the torture of
children, the shelling of civilians in order to sow terror are crimes
against humanity and we must not shy away from declaring these
acts and insisting on their recognition. We serve no purpose but
our own disgrace by hiding, obscuring or downplaying these facts.

4

but our goal must be more than the satisfaction of our appetite for
justice.

As a nation and as a leader in the international community, we
continue to have powerful interest in seeing the ultimate destruc-
tion of the Assad regime. But that doesn’t mean that we want to
see Syria in anarchy without any government. We want Assad’s
forces to stop the killing. We want Assad gone. But that doesn’t
mean sundry airstrikes or the mere declaration of safe zones will
succeed in achieving these ends. We want the Syrian opposition to
cohere, to stake out strong, determined positions regarding a lib-
eral, Democratic, pluralistic Syria to come. But it doesn’t nec-
essarily follow that releasing a flood of arms will facilitate that ob-
jective. We need to engage both our heads and our hearts.

Yes, Assad must go and we need, from both a moral and a na-
tional interest position, to facilitate that effort. But determining
how to do that is considerably more complex than simply declaring
it to be good to do so. It is all well and good for politicians and pun-
dits to make robust speeches. For some, exhortations meet the defi-
nition of duty. Nevertheless, words, however righteous and might-
ily declared, do not feed refugees. They do not send soldiers back
to their barracks. They do not collapse corrupt, bloody, failed re-
gimes.

Diplomacy that makes space for the Syrian people’s continued
popular protests, international cooperation that facilitates the
movement of relief supplies, economic sanctions that pressure and
squeeze don’t inspire us. No statues will be built and no parades
will be marched to honor the slow and hopefully steady constriction
of a still tightening political-economic noose around Assad and his
thugs.

Our goal of course is not wish fulfillment or glory. We are en-
gaged in this work because it is our essential moral obligation and
because it serves key national security goals. And that is why de-
spite the starts and stops, despite the agonizing slow pace, despite
the endless frustration of coalition building and the diplomatic en-
gagement with adversaries, we must keep at this work until it is
done. Assad must go, and for that the noose must tighten. And
with the means we have we must speed the work.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman. We appre-
ciate your statement. And we certainly appreciate the distin-
guished panel that we have before us this afternoon, and I will in-
troduce them at this time, before they will have 5 minutes to tes-
tify, each.

We first have Andrew Tabler who is a Next Generation Fellow
in the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute where
he focuses on Syria and U.S. policy in the Levant. Tabler served
most recently as a consultant on U.S-Syria relations for the Inter-
national Crisis Group, and is a Fellow of the Institute of Current
World, writing on Syrian, Lebanese and Middle Eastern affairs.
Mr. Tabler received his B.A. from William and Jefferson College,
and his M.A. from the American University in Cairo. We welcome
you here this afternoon.

And next we will have a speaker, Mara E. Karlin who is a lec-
turer and Ph.D. Candidate in Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins

5

University’s School of Advanced International Studies. Previously
she served in a variety of policy positions in the U.S. Defense De-
partment including Levant director and special assistant to the Un-
dersecretary of Defense for Policy. In connection with her work at
the Pentagon, she received the Secretary of Defense Meritorious Ci-
vilian Service Award. She is a consultant to the office of the Sec-
retary of Defense for Policy, and an adjunct scholar at the RAND
Corporation.

And our third and final witness will be Marc Lynch who is an
associate professor of Political Science and International Affairs at
the George Washington University, where he also directs the Insti-
tute for Middle East Studies. He is also a nonresident senior fellow
at the Center for a New American Security, and director on the
Project on Middle East Political Science. He is also the editor of the
Columbia University Press book series, Columbia Studies in Middle
East Politics. He received his Ph.D. in Government from Cornell
University.

And we welcome all three of you here this afternoon, and as you
know our rules allow 5 minutes from each, and we have a lighting
system on your desk. The yellow light will warn you that you have
1 minute to wrap up, and the red light means that we would appre-
ciate it if you would complete your testimony at that time or short-
ly thereafter.

So we will begin with you, Mr. Tabler. You are recognized for 5
minutes.

STATEMENT OF MR. ANDREW TABLER, NEXT GENERATION
FELLOW, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

Mr. Tabler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Ackerman, and thank you for this opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee today on the situation in Syria, and U.S. Govern-
ment efforts to force Bashar al-Assad to step aside, as outlined by
President Obama in August 2011.

During Part I of this hearing in December of last year, a rep-
resentative of the Obama administration characterized Assad as a
“dead man walking.” I agreed with that assessment at the time
and I think much of it still holds true. International pressure and
sanctions placed upon the Assad regime are having an unprece-
dented effect on its ability to fund its operations, and evidence
shows that hard currency reserves are being rapidly depleted. Un-
fortunately, however, repeated vetoes by Russia and China at the
United Nations Security Council, the overall lack of defections from
the core of the Assad regime, and the findings of a recent visit I
made to southern Turkey and Lebanon have all helped me under-
stand that Assad still has many more political and military re-
sources that he can call upon to continue what is literally now a
death march for months if not years to come. To force Assad to step
aside, the United States will need to accelerate efforts from the
ground up by supporting the opposition “within Syria” in concert
with allies forming the core of the Friends of the Syrian People
group of countries.

The Assad regime’s continued suppression of the Syrian opposi-
tion continues, and has claimed upwards of 10,000 lives thus far.
Thousands more have been arrested or displaced including those

6

that have fled to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Recently the United
Nations Security Council passed a resolution backing a six-point
plan developed by special envoy Kofi Annan intended to bring
about a cessation of hostilities and a process to facilitate a “Syrian-
led political transition to a democratic, plural political system.” De-
spite agreeing to this plan, the Assad regime has failed to meet
agreed deadlines to cease use of live fire and heavy weapons as
well as its commitments to withdraw its forces from population
centers.

The United Nations has also approved a plan to place 300 mon-
itors in Syria for up to 3 months to observe implementation of the
plan. Given the regime’s failure to observe the agreement thus far,
it is unclear if the monitors will be able to do their jobs. What the
regime’s failure to implement the agreement thus far shows, how-
ever, is that what has become known as the Annan plan may be
able to deal with some of the symptoms of the crisis in Syria, in-
cluding introduction of monitors and delivery of humanitarian as-
sistance, but has little hope of dealing with the disease itself, a mi-
nority-dominated regime with a 42-year track record of being un-
able to reform, now brutally suppressing an opposition carved out
of one of the youngest populations in the Middle East outside of the
Palestinian territories.

The regime has thus far had a harder time dealing with civil re-
sistance over the past year than armed resistance. Assad’s actions
thus far indicate that he wants to use the Annan plan to grind
down not only the armed opposition in the country, but the overall
protest movement as a whole. Thus the Annan plan as currently
implemented serves Assad’s interests and directly undermines
those of the United States.

The introduction of monitors is a positive development, but only
insofar as it will help guarantee Syrians’ right to peacefully express
themselves in favor of the Assad regime stepping aside. Quite sim-
ply, the regime is failing to implement point two of the Annan
plan, halting fighting and use of heavy weapons and withdrawing
its forces from population centers, because it knows well it cannot
implement point six of the plan, respect freedom of association and
the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.

Assad knows well that peaceful protestors, who have continued
their activities unabated as the international community has fo-
cused its attention on the armed opposition, will fill in the main
squares and demand his departure or worse. To preclude this sce-
nario he has labeled the peaceful protestors as terrorists and used
live fire to put them down.

The best way the United States has of ensuring that President
Assad steps aside and expediting the more democratic government
in Syria is to implement Plan B, a coordinated effort to pressure
the regime from the ground up, including support for the opposition
within Syria. This effort is already underway, partially, and would
be implemented in addition to the sanctions and other diplomatic
pressure. So I want to emphasize this would not replace what the
administration has done up until now but would augment it.

The United States is a member of the Friends of the Syrian Peo-
ple, a collection of 83 countries which met for the second time on
April 1st. Its core members include Britain, France, Germany, Tur-

7

key and Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to forge and lead a coalition of
countries to more directly support the opposition within Syria.
Thus far the United States has committed to only giving nonlethal
assistance to the opposition in that country, which could include
communications equipment.

Pressuring the Assad regime to end violence against the popu-
lation and ultimately make an exit will require such U.S. assist-
ance and much more. In the short term, the United States should
share limited intelligence with the opposition inside of the country
on the regime’s movements.

Second, the United States should intensify its examination of the
opposition within Syria and see, quite frankly, which groups with
whom we could work and perhaps with whom we cannot work,
given their long-term goals in Syria.

And third, Washington should immediately expand contingency
planning about possible direct U.S. military support as part of ac-
tions to head off massacres or a humanitarian disaster. This in-
cludes supporting the creation, with such allies as Turkey, of safe
havens inside of Syria. In addition, the United States should con-
sider what kind of military force may be required, and under what
circumstances, to assist the opposition in deposing the Assad re-
gime.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tabler follows:]

8

Confronting Damascus:

U.S. Policy toward the Evolving Situation in Syria, Part II

Andrew J. Tabler

Next Generation Fellow, Program on Arab Politics, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives,

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
April 25, 2012

Chairman Chabotand Ranking Member Ackerman:

Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South
Asia on the situation in Syria and U.S. government efforts to force President Bashar al-Assad to
"step aside,” as outlined by President Obama in August 2011.

During Part I of this hearing in December 2011, a representative of the Obama administration
characterized Assad as a "dead man walking." I agreed with that assessment at the time, and I
think much of it still holds true: international pressure and sanctions placed upon the Assad
regime are having an unprecedented effect on its ability to fund its operations, and evidence
shows that hard currency reserves are being rapidly depleted. Unfortunately, however, repeated
vetoes by Russia and China of United Nations Security Council action, the overall lack of
"defections” from the core of the Assad regime, and the findings of a recent visit I made to
southern Turkey and Lebanon have all helped me understand that Assad still has many more
political and military resources that he can call upon to continue what is literally a "death march”
for months if not years to come. To force Assad to "step aside,” the United States will need to
accelerate efforts from the ground up by supporting the opposition "within Syria" in concert with
allies forming the "core" of the Friends of the Syrian People group of countries.

Treating the Symptoms but Not the Disease of the Syria Crisis

The Assad regime's continued suppression of the Syrian opposition continues, and has claimed
upwards of 10,000 lives thus far. Thousands more have been arrested or displaced, including
those that have fled to Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, Recently, the United Nations Security
Council passed a resolution backing a six-point plan developed by special envoy Kofi Annan
intended to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a process to facilitate a "Syrian-led political
transition to a democratic, plural political system." Despite agreeing to the plan, the Assad regime
has failed to meet agreed deadlines to cease use of live fire and heavy weapons, as well as its
commitments to withdraw its forces from population centers. The UN has also approved a plan to
place up to 300 monitors in Syria for up to three months to observe implementation of the plan.
Given the regime's failure to observe the agreement thus far, it is unclear if the monitors will be
able to do their jobs. What the regime’s failure to implement the agreement thus far shows,
however, is that what has become known as the "Annan plan" may be able to deal with some of
the symptoms of the crisis in Syria, including introduction of monitors and delivery of
humanitarian assistance, but it has little hope of dealing with the disease itself -- a minority-

1

9

dominated regime with a forty-two-year track record of being unable to reform, and now brutally
suppressing an opposition carved out of one of the youngest populations in the Middle East.

The UN monitors who arrived in Damascus recently have observed protestors brave enough to
endure a military lockdown that is severely limiting the people's ability to use civil resistance to
make Assad "step aside" -- the stated goal of President Obama. The regime has had a far harder
time dealing with civil resistance over the past year than armed resistance. Assad's actions thus
far indicate that he wants to use the Annan plan to grind down not only the armed opposition, but
the overall protest movement as a whole. Thus the Annan plan, as currently implemented, serves
Assad's interests and directly undermines those of the United States,

The introduction of monitors is a positive development, but only insofar as it will help guarantee
Syrians' right to peacefully express themselves in favor of the Assad regime stepping aside. Quite
simply, the regime is failing to implement point two of the Annan plan -- halting fighting and use
of heavy weapons and withdrawing its forces from population centers -- because it knows it
cannot implement point six of the plan: "respect freedom of association and the right to
demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed." Assad knows well that peaceful protestors, who
have continued their activities unabated as the international community has focused its attention
on the armed opposition, will fill Syria's main squares and demand his departure or worse. To
preclude this scenario, he has labeled peaceful protestors as "terrorists" and used live fire to put
them down.

Diplomacy will continue to play an important role as the crisis unfolds. In the end, Russia and
China may be important as part of any effort to get Assad to step aside and usher in a Syrian
government more responsive to the demands of its youthful population. But Assad's dodging of
the Annan plan's deadline, as well as his attempt via Russia to blur the main tenets of the
agreement by introducing monitors before a ceasefire, amply demonstrate the limits of diplomacy
at this time.

But perhaps most important, the regime's failure to seriously implement the plan calls into
question whether any viable political solution can emerge from Annan's stated goal of
"comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the spectrum of the
opposition." In the end, whatever solution emerges will of course be uniquely Syrian. But what will
it look like? A "reform" of the political system similar to Lebanon’s, where various posts and bodies
are essentially allotted to different sects, with Alawites and other minorities gathered around the
presidency and the parliament going to the majority Sunni population? The Lebanese system was
formed over time and in many ways is dysfunctional. A "managed transition" similar to Yemen — a
goal of the Obama administration -- may be preferable. But Assad seems unlikely to negotiate his
own exit, especially as Russia and China have forbidden language in Security Council resolutions
outlining what the end goal of the process would be.

Plan B: A Ground-Up Strategy

The best way the United States has of ensuring that President Assad steps aside and expediting a
more democratic government in Syria is to implement "Plan B" -- a coordinated effort to pressure
the regime from the ground up, including support for the opposition "within Syria." This effort is
already partially underway and would be implemented in addition to sanctions and other
diplomatic pressure.

2

10

The United States is a member of the Friends of the Syrian Peopie, a coiiection of eighty -three
countries that met for the second time on April 1 in Istanbul to support the people and prepare for
a post-Assad Syria, Washington would be well placed to work with the group's other core
members -- which include Britain, France, Germany, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar -- to forge
and lead a coalition of countries to more directly support the opposition within Syria and prepare
for all contingencies concerning the crisis. Different countries would play different roles within this
coalition. Gulf countries, for example, have already indicated a willingness to help arm the
opposition within Syria. Turkey, which had to deal recently with live fire from Assad's forces in the
Oncupinar Syrian refugee camp near Kills, is now considering methods to funnel support to the
opposition and has reportedly developed a contingency plan to create border safe havens for
refugees within Syrian territory. Thus far, the United States has officially committed to giving
nonlethal assistance to the opposition within Syria, which could include communications
equipment.

Pressuring Assad to end violence against the population and, ultimately, make an exit will require
more such U.S. assistance, In the short term, the United States should share limited intelligence
with the opposition inside Syria concerning the deployment and movement of regime forces --
security, military, and paramilitary shabbiha -- especially as they approach population centers for
an assault. This will help alleviate the effects of Assad's "whack-a-mole" approach to the
opposition, in which regime forces attempt to clear areas -- a tactic that drives up death tolls and
refugee flows -- but cannot hold them.

Second, the United States should intensify its examination of the opposition within Syria, both
those entities practicing nonviolent resistance against the regime and those engaged in violent
revolt. Such assessment should include ways to support popular self-defense alongside civil
resistance as two sides of the opposition coin. A key first step would be to intensify the process of
identifying and engaging groups that share not only Washington's short-term goal of ousting
Assad, but also its long-term goals, including a democratic and secular post-Assad Syria whose
government respects human and minority rights.

Third, Washington should immediately expand contingency planning about possible direct U.S.
military support as part of actions to head off massacres or a humanitarian disaster. This includes
supporting the creation, with allies such as Turkey, of safe havens inside Syria. In addition, the
United States should consider what kind of military force may be required, and under what
circumstances, to assist the Syrian opposition in deposing the Assad regime.

Dilemmas Posed by Civil and Armed Resistance Will Accelerate Assad's Departure

Washington should continue to press for UN Security Council resolutions or statements
condemning Assad. But to base its approach on the likelihood of international consensus on a
workable and sustainable solution to the crisis would be unwise at this time.

The best means of whittling away the regime's support base continues to be exposing Assad’s
brutal response to dilemmas posed by the civil and armed opposition inside Syria. What is going
on in Syria is not a civil war, but an armed and unarmed insurrection against a regime that
responded with extreme brutality to peaceful protest. The opposition in exile organized under the
Syrian National Council may be rife with divisions, but as the conflict has morphed into a civil and
armed insurgency against the regime, coordination among atomized opposition groups inside Syria
has intensified for reasons of sheer survival. The United States needs to find ways to promote.

3

11

assist, and influence that trend. Such trials by fire, which now are an inevitabie part of the
uprising, will likely serve as the forge in which a viable post-Assad Syrian political system is
formed, Greater U.S, involvement would increase the chances that the new Syria is much more
democratic and closer to American interests than Bashar al-Assad's regime.

Thank you.

4

12

Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. We appreciate your testi-
mony.

Ms. Karlin, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF MS. MARA E. KARLIN, INSTRUCTOR IN STRA-
TEGIC STUDIES, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL

STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Ms. Karlin. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Mem-
ber Ackerman. Thank you for holding this important hearing on
U.S. policy toward Syria and for inviting me to participate.

Let me state my bottom line up front. The United States knows
what it does not want in Syria. But getting to what it does want,
the end of the Assad regime, will be messy, difficult and
unsatisfying. With that in mind and given the varied constraints
on the United States, we can best support transition in Syria by
playing a signaling role. There is no debate about the repugnant
and despicaWe acts of the Assad regime in Syria. The longer this
conflict lasts, the more bloody, internecine and tragic it will be.

To expand on my bottom line, I would like to offer three critical
observations. First, let us step back and dissect what the United
States does not want in Syria. We do not want Assad to stay in
power. He has proven to be venal and vicious, a murderous thug.
We do not want a power vacuum that facilitates continued civil war
or begs for a robust long-term U.S. nation-building effort, or en-
ables Syrian territory to be manipulated and disrupted by rogue
nonstate and external actors. And we do not want continued vio-
lence. Violence that has already resulted in ten times more deaths
than when the international community first intervened in Libya
last year.

Second, nearly one decade ago. General David Petraeus, looking
at the impending chaos in Iraq, posed a crucial question, “Tell me
how this ends.” The outcome in Syria is not evident today, but I
can say with some confidence how it will not end. It will not end
with Bashar al-Assad voluntarily stepping aside or choosing exile.
It will not end with him making sufficient reforms to enable a
transparent and free Syria. This regime will not permit actions
that serve to undermine and ultimately overthrow its rule. Those
who predicted Assad’s speedy collapse or asserted his willingness
to inaugurate a new Syria have been proven spectacularly wrong,
for Syria today remains immersed in violence and Assad remains
entrenched. And how and when Assad departs, will invariably af-
fect the contours and dynamics of the new Syria.

Both of these points illustrate how messy, difficult and
unsatisfying our options are. We would be wise to recall them as
we consider what the United States should be doing to effectively
support transition there, which brings me to my third and final
point.

Our operating maxim should be the following. Facilitate the end
of the Assad regime while coalescing alternative, viable and inclu-
sive leadership. Both objectives must be actively pursued. To date,
efforts to isolate, sanction and advertise the regime’s bad behavior
have degraded its capabilities, and efforts to support the opposition
have helped it delineate a vision of a new Syria. They should be
redoubled, emphasizing to key supporters of the Assad regime both

13

inside and outside of Syria that a transition will occur, and their
interests are best served if this happens soon.

But above all, the United States can play a signaling role. It can
leverage its comparative advantage as the critical actor to whom
other states have looked to for guidance as they respond to the
Assad regime’s atrocities. Over the last year when the United
States has signaled both publicly and privately that it supports vig-
orous efforts to undermine and counter the regime, it has had an
impact.

Washington’s active participation in the Friends of Syria com-
mittee is an important step, as is its increasing support to the Free
Syrian Army. In that vein, the United States has signaled what it
will provide, such as communications, intelligence and nonlethal
assistance. Providing such capabilities signals U.S. willingness to
support an alternative to the regime but with limited cost and com-
mitment.

The United States has also signaled what it will not obstruct,
such as other states paying salaries and providing equipment.
However, for the FSA to seriously counter the Syrian regime and
its military, it needs to be transformed into a coherent and effective
fighting force. Solely focusing on equipment assistance will ulti-
mately have a limited impact. Meaningful support will require sub-
stantial training, advice, potential reorganization and shifts in per-
sonnel, and an overall refinement of its capabilities. To be sure, a
strengthened opposition is significant, but it is unlikely to tip the
balance in the near term.

Signaling shows that the United States will not stop other states
from taking more serious steps to counter the regime. For those re-
gional players that seek to more actively and militarily confront the
Assad regime, the United States should not prevent them from
doing so, and should consider how it might play a limited com-
plementary role. As Syria’s neighbors are flooded by refugees and
increasingly destabilized by the upheaval next door, the signal that
Washington sends will be of even greater consequence.

In conclusion, the Middle East is mired in uncertainty and
fraught with upheaval. For the United States, this arena is more
difficult and complex to navigate today than ever before. Yet our
interests are largely the same as they were before the revolutions.
We must be cautious in our decision making, to be sure, but also
cognizant of our priorities.

I thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I am ready to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Karlin follows:]

14

Mara E. Karlin

Instructor and Ph.D. Candidate

Johns Hopkins University, Schooi of Advanced Internationai Studies
Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
"Confronting Damascus: U.S. Poiicy Toward the Evoiving Situation in Syria, Part II"

25 April 2012

Good afternoon. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. Thank you for
holding this important hearing on U.S. policy toward Syria, and for inviting me to
participate.

Let me state my bottom-line up front:

The United States knows what it does not want in Syria.

But getting to what it does want — the end of the Asad regime — will be messy,
difficult, and unsatisfying.

With that in mind — and given the varied constraints on the United States — we
can best support transition in Syria by playing a signaling role.

There is no debate about the repugnant and despicable acts of the Asad regime in
Syria. Indeed, two important — and distressing — markers recently passed. First, the
Syrian revolution has been raging for more than a year, significantly longer than the
revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Second, Syrian President Bashar al-
Asad and his cronies have wantonly murdered upwards of 10,000 Syrians. They are
continuing — and will continue — to do so. The longer this conflict lasts, the more
bloody, internecine and tragic it will be.

To expand on my bottom-line, 1 would like to offer three critical observations:

1) First, let us step back and dissect what the United States does not want in Syria.
We do not want Asad to stay in power. He has proven to be venal and vicious — a
murderous thug. We do not want a power vacuum that facilitates continued civil
war, or begs for a robust long-term U.S. nation-building effort, or enables Syrian
territory to be manipulated and disrupted by rogue non-state and external
actors. And, we do not want continued violence — violence that has already
resulted in ten times more deaths than when the international community first
intervened in Libya last year.

2) Second, nearly one decade ago. General David Petraeus, looking at the impending
chaos in Iraq, posed a crucial question, "Tell me how this ends.” The outcome in
Syria is not evident today, but 1 can say with some confidence how it will not
end. It will not end with Bashar al-Asad voluntarily stepping aside, or choosing
exile. It will not end with him making sufficient reforms to enable a transparent
and free Syrian state. Those who predicted his speedy collapse or asserted his
willingness to inaugurate a new Syria have been proven spectacularly wrong, for

1

15

Syria today remains immersed in violence and Asad remains entrenched. And
how and when Asad departs will Invariably affect the contours and dynamics of
the new Syria.

Let me be clear: continued oppression and violence In Syria will continue, it may
briefly stop If either the Asad regime or the opposition chooses to back down;
however, this would only be a respite in the civil war and Insurgency currently
sweeping across Syria. This regime will not permit actions that serve to undermine,
and ultimately overthrow. Its rule. Of course, the opposition could choose to return
to the status quo ante for the near-term, to re-group, and then return to confront the
regime. Doing so will no doubt be difficult since the regime will have learned
Important lessons about sustaining repression after the last year of conflict, as well
as the identities of potential troublemakers. Recall that the Asad dynasty has a
history — a genetic history — of harsh and severe retribution.

Both of these points Illustrate how messy, difficult, and unsatisfying our options are
in Syria. Yet, they only begin to address the very real constraints that exist on the
United States at this moment, including fiscal and political. We would be wise to
recall them, as we consider just what the United States should be doing to effectively
support transition In Syria, which brings me to my final point.

3) Third, if we accept that the United States must choose amongst options

brimming with tension and uncertainty, there are important steps that we can
take. Our operating maxim should be the following: facilitate the end of the Asad
regime while coalescing alternative, viable and inclusive leadership. Both
objectives must be actively pursued.

To date, efforts to isolate and sanction the Asad regime have met with
resounding success, garnering support throughout much of the international
community, and degrading the regime’s capabilities. They should be continued
and deepened where possible. Similarly, nascent efforts to advertise the
regime’s bad behavior are useful. They should be redoubled, emphasizing to key
supporters of the Asad regime inside and outside of Syria that a transition will
occur, and their interests will be best served if this happens sooner rather than
later. And, uniting the opposition and supporting its efforts to delineate a vision
of a new Syria have proven their usefulness.

But above all, the United States can play a signaling role. The United States can
leverage its comparative advantage as the critical actor to whom other states
have looked to for guidance as they respond to the Asad regime’s atrocities. Over
the lastyear, when the United States has signaled — both publicly and privately —
that it supports vigorous efforts to undermine and counter the regime, it has had
an impact.

Washington’s active participation in the Friends of Syria committee is an
important step, as is its increasing supportto the Free Syrian Army [FSA).

2

16

In that vein, the United States has signaled what aid it will provide — such as
communications, intelligence and non-lethal assistance. Providing such
capabilities signals U.S. willingness to support an alternative to the Asad regime,
but with limited cost and commitment The United States has also signaled what
it will not obstruct such as other states paying salaries and providing equipment
to the FSA. However, for the FSA to seriously counter the Syrian regime and its
military, it needs to be transformed into a coherent and effective fighting force.
Solely focusing on equipment assistance will ultimately have a limited impact on
the FSA. Meaningful support will require substantial training advice, potential
reorganization and shifts in personnel, and an overall refinement of its
capabilities. To be sure, a strengthened opposition is significant, but it is unlikely
to tip the balance in the near-term.

Signaling shows that the United States will not stop other states from taking
more serious steps to counter the Asad regime. For those regional players that
seek to more actively and militarily confront the Asad regime, the United States
should not prevent them from doing so, and should consider how it might play a
limited, complementary role. As Syria's neighbors are flooded by refugees and
increasingly destabilized by the upheaval next door — indeed, Ankara has
indicated it may call on NATO to invoke Article 5 — the signals that Washington
sends will be of even greater consequence.

In conclusion, the Middle East is mired in uncertainty and fraught with upheaval.

For the United States, this arena is more difficult and complex to navigate today than
ever before. Yet our interests in the region remain largely the same as they were
before the revolutions. We must be cautious in our decision-making, to be sure, but
also cognizant of our priorities.

I thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I am ready to
answer any questions you may have.

3

17

Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much for your testimony.

And finally, Dr. Lynch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF MARC LYNCH, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF POLIT-
ICAL SCIENCE, DIRECTOR OF INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST

STUDIES, ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Mr. Lynch. I thank you Chairman Chahot and Ranking Member
Ackerman, and thank you to my two colleagues for their very
thoughtful presentations, much of which I agree with.

I would begin with the fact that less than 2 weeks ago a ceasefire
came into effect in Syria, which many people did not believe was
possible. Four days ago, an unanimous United Nations Security
Council resolution was adopted, authorizing a 300-member team to
monitor the ceasefire, something else which many people believed
to be impossible.

These accomplishments are not ones to be easily or lightly set
aside. The urgent and admirable imperative to do something to
help the people of Syria and to attempt to bring about the downfall
of the Bashar al-Assad regime should not mean that the United
States rushes into a poorly conceived military intervention. This
painstakingly constructed international consensus and a plan
which was always designed to take time to manifest should not be
abandoned before it has even had the chance to succeed. There are
no easy answers to the Syria problem. It is one of the most difficult
that I have dealt with in all of my years working on the Middle
East.

But I respectfully disagree that the Annan plan either helps us
out or hurts the United States. It remains the best option that we
have available to us to create the political space which would make
it possible for the Syrian people to bring about a change from with-
in, without embroiling the United States in a protracted, messy
and difficult ongoing insurgency. There are no cheap or easy forms
of military intervention which would quickly bring down the regime
of Bashar al-Assad or effectively protect Syrian civilians. There are
many measures which we could take, which would likely increase
the odds of Assad’s survival while increase the deaths of Syrian ci-
vilians, and it is incumbent upon us to avoid making such foolish
decisions.

We also must be highly cognizant of the risks of limited half
measures which leave us unable to succeed, but find us embroiled
in subsequent steps which could end up placing us in a situation
comparable to that of Iraq, where we find ourselves forced to patrol
and take responsibility for a shattered polity where we are not
wanted.

Rejecting military action does not mean doing nothing. This is a
false choice. The United States has effectively taken the lead in
constructing this international consensus, which did not appear by
magic. The six-point plan presented by U.N. Special Envoy Kofi
Annan offers a plausible, obviously far from certain, path toward
the demilitarization of the conflict and a subsequent political tran-
sition. The ceasefire obviously has not ended the killing, but it has
substantially reduced the violence. Since that ceasefire began there
has been a dramatic increase in peaceful protest across the coun-

18

try, and this holds out the hope and demonstrates that the will of
the Syrian people has not been broken. We must continue to place
pressure on the Syrian regime, increasing economic sanctions, its
diplomatic isolation, and preparing for future international justice
and accountability, but we should not rush into a military interven-
tion which might be satisfying in the short term but leave us with
something far worse than we currently have.

In my prepared statement, I discuss in some detail the short-
comings of a number of available military options including safe
zones, humanitarian corridors, arming the opposition and more. I
won’t take time to talk about those here, though I am happy to dis-
cuss them in the questions.

The fundamental point that I would like to make in the time re-
maining to me is that while the current diplomatic strategy is
clearly frustrating, difficult and faces long odds, it is not something
which is designed simply to buy time and to not act. There is a
logic behind Annan’s plan. And that logic is that it is the mili-
tarization of the conflict which serves the survival of Bashar al-
Assad’s regime. The opposition is incapable of winning by force,
and it is very unlikely that anything that we do will change that.
At the same time, the center of Syrian politics and the very real
constituencies which continue to support Bashar al-Assad are
bound to him by fear of the future. Minority communities fear that
they will face retribution. That they will revenge killings. That
they will be butchered in the aftermath of the fall of Bashar al-
Assad.

The demilitarization and the ceasefire which Kofi Annan is pur-
suing are precisely designed to reduce those fears and to carve out
the political space necessary to begin a genuine political transition.
Nobody, not me and I believe not Kofi Annan, believes that Bashar
al-Assad will agree to voluntarily end his regime. He has never
demonstrated any willingness or ability to do so. But that is nei-
ther necessary for the plan or its objective. Instead, the objective
is to create the space for Syrians to find a way to remove Assad
by calculating that their interests are best served to rescue their
country by removing Assad themselves. And our job must be to cre-
ate the international space to make that possible.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lynch follows:]

19

Dr. Marc Lynch

George Washington University and the Center for a New American Security

Prepared Statement for “Confronting Damascus: U.S. Policy toward the Evolving Situation

in Syria, Part II.” April 25, 2012.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia

“ft is time for the Obama Administration to acknowledge what is obvious and
indisputable in Syria: the Annan Plan has failed.” This declaration by Senators
Lieberman, McCain and Graham on April 1 9, 20 1 2, came only one week after a United
Nations-backed ceasefire came into effect, and two days before the passage of a
unanimous United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing a 300 member team to
monitor the ceasefire. The urgent, and admirable, imperative to do something to help the
people of Syria should not rush the United States into a poorly conceived military
intervention. The painstakingly constructed international consensus in support of
diplomacy and pressure should not be abandoned before it has even had a chance.

Nobody expects the current diplomatic path to quickly or easily end the conflict in Syria,
but military intervention does not offer a compelling alternative. There are no cheap or
easy forms of military intervention which would quickly bring down the regime of
Bashar al-Assad or effectively protect Syrian civilians. Military half-measures, including
safe zones, humanitarian corridors and arming the Syrian opposition, would likely spread
the violence and increase the numbers of Syrian dead without increasing the likelihood of
regime collapse. An initially limited intervention would most likely pave the way to
more direct and expensive involvement comparable to the experience in Iraq.

Rejecting military action does not mean doing nothing. The United States has effectively
taken the lead in constructing an international consensus in support of diplomatic efforts,
including two unanimous Security Council resolutions and ever-tightening economic
sanctions. The Six Point Plan presented by UN Special Envoy Kofi Annan offers a
plausible, if still far from certain, path towards a demilitarization of the conflict and
political transition. The ceasefire for which the United Nations called has not ended the
killing, but it has substantially reduced the violence even before the entry of the full
international monitoring mission. What is more, the number of peaceful protests across
Syria has significantly increased in the two weeks since the ceasefire began. Economic
sanctions are taking a real toll on an increasingly isolated Syrian regime.

It is far too soon to give up on a diplomatic process which has just begun. Rather than
rush into a risky, costly and potentially counter-productive military intervention, the
United States should give the current plan time to work, it should continue to lead
international efforts at the United Nations, promote the demilitarization of the conflict,
continue to increase the pressure on the Assad regime, build on the efforts underway with
the “Friends of Syria” group, support the political development of the Syrian opposition,
and prepare the ground for future accountability for war crimes.

20

Limited Military Options

The calls forU.S. military intervention in Syria reflect an understandable frustration with
the ongoing crisis and with President Assad’s defiance of international consensus. But we
must not forget the lessons of the poorly conceived military intervention and occupation
of Iraq, with its vast human cost and unintended consequences. Even a limited military
involvement in Syria risks embroiling the United States into a far longer and more
extensive intervention than currently imagined, without protecting the Syrian people from
further atrocities or quickly changing the regime in Damascus. T discuss the problems
with limited military intervention in detail in Pressure Without War: a Principled and
Pragmatic Strategy for Syria, published by the Center for a New American Security on
February 21, 2012. I summarize here some of the key points.

It is not enough to demonstrate that the cause of intervention is just. The available
military options do not have a reasonable chance of improving the situation at an
acceptable cost, and could easily make matters worse. Syria is not Libya, where the
United States acted with a clear mandate from the UN Security Council and could use air
power in support of a well-organized opposition which controlled territory. Syria’ s
demographics, geography, divided population, strategic location, military capabilities and
international alliances pose a far more daunting target. We should not rely on overly
optimistic assumptions about the efficacy of an intervention, the response of the Syrian
regime and its international allies, or our ability to manage the conflict. There are
vanishingly few historical examples of entrenched regimes embroiled in a civil war
suddenly collapsing after a symbolic show of force from outside. Most likely, limited
military intervention would alter but not end the dynamics of a long conflict, embroiling
the United States directly in a protracted and bloody insurgency and civil war.

There are at least four different, and potentially conflicting, objectives for military action
against Syria which have been articulated; civilian protection; regime change; weakening
Iran; and political credibility. These goals are not necessarily mutually compatible.
Arming the Free Syrian Army, for instance, would likely lead to a dramatic increase in
lost civilian lives and have only dubious hopes of speeding regime change, but increase
the chances of embroiling Syria in a long crisis which would harm Iran. Those hoping
primarily to change the regime in Syria oppose diplomatic efforts which might reduce
civilian deaths.

Finally, the United States must not intervene without international legal authority. Acting
without a UN Security Council resolution would undermine the administration’s efforts
to restore international legitimacy to the center of global politics, and would risk deeply
undermining both international institutions and American relations with Russia, China
and the developing world. A UN authorization of force against Syria is exceedingly
unlikely, however, barring a dramatic escalation of violence. The support of Arab
regional organizations and of NATO is important, but does not substitute for the UN.

All forms of limited intervention would likely begin with significant initial air strikes to
eliminate air defenses, establish control of the skies and allow freedom of action by the

21

forces involved. Syrian anti-aircraft capabilities may not be particularly formidable, but
no country would risk flying in Syrian air space until these capabilities are destroyed.

Y et many Syrian anti-aircraft capabilities are located in or near urban areas, which means
that significant civilian casualties could result from any attempt to eliminate them. There
is little doubt that the US. military could do this if called upon, but it would not be a
costless enterprise and would not alone likely end the conflict.

More likely, a no fly zone would pave the way towards a more expansive air campaign
targeting Syrian regime ground forces or defending designated safe areas. Many argue
that a bombing campaign might force the regime to the bargaining table, boost the morale
of the opposition and demoralize regime supporters. Perhaps, but this would be a risky
gamble with fleeting benefits, and would likely evolve into a longer-term commitment.
There is little reason to believe that the regime would quickly crumble, or that more
opposition would rally, in the face of such strikes. What is more, significant civilian
casualties or easily-stoked nationalist anger at a foreign bombing campaign might well
rally Syrians around the regime rather than turn them towards the opposition.

Using air power to protect civilians and defend the opposition within safe areas or
humanitarian corridors is even more complex. Such safe areas could most easily be
established and protected along the Turkish border, but most of the threatened civilians
live in other parts of Syria. Humanitarian corridors would be extremely difficult to
protect, and could create a new refugee crisis if desperate civilians rush into designated
safe zones or neighboring countries. Protecting either would require a serious
commitment of resources. Declaring a safe area without defending it effectively would
only repeat the painful mistakes of history. In Bosnia, thousands of people were
murdered in Srebrenica and other designated safe areas when peacekeepers lacked the
means to protect them. Even historical “successes” are sobering. Operation Provide
Comfort, established in northern Iraq after 1991, was envisioned as a short-term crisis
response, but turned into a 12-year commitment that ended only when the United States
invaded Iraq in 2003. Creating and protecting a safe area in Syria would therefore
require a significant and lengthy investment of troops and resources, and would not likely
hasten Assad’s collapse.

The United States and its partners could conduct an extended tactical air campaign,
becoming a de facto air force for the FSA, targeting Syrian regime forces and evening the
military balance in favor of the opposition. But in contrast to Libya, there are no front
lines to police, few tank convoys to destroy on desert highways and no offensives by
rebel armies for which an air campaign would clear a path. Regime forces and the
opposition are primarily clashing in densely packed urban areas. Civilian casualties
would inevitably result from a bombing campaign against ill-defined targets in urban
areas with extremely limited human intelligence. And such a campaign in support of a
fragmented and weak opposition would almost certainly escalate.

Finally, some are calling on the United States government to arm the opposition,
providing advanced weapons, communications equipment and other support to even the
balance of power and would enable the Syrian opposition to defend itself and take the

22

fight to Assad. This is often presented as the least intrusive path. But in fact it might be
the worst of all the options. Providing arms to the opposition would not likely allo-w it to
prevail over the Syrian military. The regime would likely discard whatever restraint it
has thus far shown in order to avoid outside intervention. What is more, the Syrian
opposition remains fragmented, disorganized and highly localized. Providing weapons
will privilege favored groups within the opposition, discredit advocates of non-military
strategies, and likely lead to ever more expansive goals. It could further frighten Syrians
who continue to support the regime out of fear for their own future, and make them less
likely to switch sides. Arming the FSA is a recipe for protracted, violent and
regionalized conflict. It would be foolish to assume that an insurgency once launched can
be easily controlled. It should also be sobering that the best example offered of historical
success of such a strategy is the American support to the Afghan jihad against the Soviet
Union, which led to the collapse of the Afghan state, the rise of the Taliban, and the
evolution of al-Qaeda.

In short, limited military options do not have a reasonable chance of ending Assad’s
regime quickly or at an acceptable price.

Give Aiiiiaii Plan a chance

Military options therefore do not offer a magic bullet for protecting Syrian civilians or
forcing a change in the Assad regime. The current diplomatic strategy faces long odds
as well, but does at least have at least some prospect of success and should not abandoned
prematurely. It is highly unlikely that Bashar al-Assad or his regime will voluntarily
comply with a ceasefire, and even more unlikely that they will surrender power. But
international diplomacy does not depend on Assad’s good intentions. Instead, it aims to
demilitarize the conflict and create the political space for change driven by Syrians
disgusted by the destruction of their country. Demilitarization through a ceasefire and
political opening would undermine Assad’s survival strategy, not save him from an
otherwise certain defeat.

Syria today remains deeply divided between a growing and resilient opposition and a still
substantial pool of regime supporters. The violence, relentless propaganda, and deep
fears about the future have polarized the country and helped to keep significant portions
of the Syrian population on the side of the regime. At the same time, the resilience and
spread of opposition protests despite massive regime violence clearly demonstrates that
the regime has lost legitimacy with an equally significant portion of the population.

Assad has proven unable to kill his way to victory, but his regime’s survival is at the
same time well-served by a violent and polarized arena.

The ceasefire, as American officials have consistently noted, is only one part of the
Annan plan, but it is an extremely important one which will test whether the regime can
survive de-escalation and demilitarization of the conflict. Unsurprisingly, Assad has
complied only partially with the ceasefire. Deaths dropped significantly after the
ceasefire came into effect on April 12, but killing has continued at a lower level and there
have been many reports of violations and attacks. But the pressure to comply will

23

continue. The expanded UN monitoring team now entering the country may have a
restraining effect, though their limited numbers and mandate will not alone be sufficient.
There has been a noticeable upsurge in peaceful protests across Syria since the ceasefire
came into effect. The focus of its efforts must still be to increase the odds of a “soft
landing” after the fall of the Assad regime, one which avoids a chaotic state collapse and
instead produces an inclusive and pluralistic political alternative.

The United States should continue to support these efforts to demilitarize the conflict. It
should continue to maintain the hard-won international consensus at the Security Council
and push Syria’s allies who have supported the current track to pressure Damascus to
comply. It should also continue to support parallel efforts to pressure Assad and to help
strengthen the fragmented and weak Syrian opposition. Economic sanctions and the civil
war itself have combined to badly hurt the Syrian economy and to increasingly isolate the
Syrian elite. Such efforts should continue and expand, with more targeted sanctions at
both unilateral and multilateral efforts. These should be tied to the other elements of the
Annan plan beyond the ceasefire, including a strong push towards a genuine political
process. The Syrian opposition should continue to reach out to and attempt to reassure
minority communities and those still supporting Assad out of fear that they will be
included and protected in a new Syria.

Should the ceasefire take effect, the U.S. should not allow a decrease in deaths to cause
international focus on Syria to lag. There should be constant, daily diplomatic pressure
and the mobilization of international condemnation. It should continue its effective
efforts to disseminate credible information about regime violations of the agreement,
such as the satellite images posted by Embassy Damascus. It should push for the regular
release of the reports of the UN monitors and accountability for violations of the
mission’s terms, and also insist on other elements of the plan such as access for
journalists. It should make a particular effort to convey credible information about
regime violence to audiences inside of Syria and to break through the propaganda which
sustains the regime’s hold on core constituencies.

The U.S. should also continue to collect information about regime atrocities for future
war crimes trials. The “Syria Accountability Clearing House” proposed at the recent
meeting of the “Friends of Syria” is an important starting point for future accountability.
If it is unable to secure Security Council support for a referral to the International
Criminal Court, the U.S. should push for the creation of an independent war crimes
tribunal for Syria.

Overall, it is easy to share the frustration with international efforts to respond to the
atrocities in Syria. Many thousands of Syrians have died as the world has struggled to
find an adequate response. There are no guarantees that the current UN plan will succeed
either, but it must be given the opportunity to develop. There are no good alternatives.
Limited military intervention is unlikely to either protect civilians or hasten Assad’s fall,
and would signal the end of the diplomatic alternatives currently unfolding. For now, the
United States must stick with “Plan A” and give diplomacy a chance to succeed.

24

Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Doctor. And we will go
ahead and ask questions. At this point I recognize myself with 5
minutes for that purpose. And I would ask Mr. Tabler and Ms.
Karlin, Dr. Lynch has painted a relatively bright picture on the
Annan plan and seems to be optimistic about its possibilities and
success. I wonder if you might feel otherwise, and if you wouldn’t
mind commenting on that. I appreciate it. We will start with you,
Mr. Tabler.

Mr. Tabler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t think Marc be-
lieves that necessarily the Annan plan is going well. What I said
in my testimony, and where I think probably we agree, is that the
Annan plan as implemented is the problem. This is not a ceasefire.
Having multiple shelling incidents a day on the third largest city
in Syria is not a ceasefire. It is not even fragile. It is just not a
ceasefire. It is a reduction in hostilities, but even that went out the
window a couple of days ago when the death toll spiked again
when they began using shelling.

They also have not completely withdrawn their military forma-
tions from cities, and this gets to what I think Marc was talking
about a little bit later on. The key part of the Annan plan is that
the Assad regime is vulnerable to civilian resistance and has been
for over a year. It is the peaceful protestors that have kept Assad
on his heels. The problem is, is that they are constrained by the
placement of military forces inside the country now. They move
them around, they move them to the outskirts of town, they put
them inside of buildings, and unfortunately, when they move them
to the outside of town they begin to use artillery and mortars on
the populations inside those cities. So the Annan plan as imple-
mented now, and this is the problem, it contravenes a pillar of U.S.
policy going back over 1 year, and that is that Syrians should be
allowed to peacefully express themselves and to assemble. And this
was established long ago, long before the Annan plan was estab-
lished. The fact is, is that this has not happened.

And so now we are sending in monitors, again which could carve
out that space for protestors. But my only response would be it gets
back to my original point, he cannot implement point two of the
plan because he cannot tolerate point six. That is, he can’t tolerate
anything that would allow Syrians to once again flood the main
squares of cities and demand that President Assad go, and this is
where he is particularly vulnerable. Thanks.

Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Ms. Karlin?

Ms. Karlin. Sir, I would just add, I think Andrew’s point about
implementation is particularly cogent, and there are two issues
that illustrate this for us. First of all, as of yesterday there were
11 out of 300 observers in Syria. Realize observers should be work-
ing 24 hours a day, so that would leave very few working at each
hour of the day even if you get to the large number of 300. So the
numbers are extraordinarily small.

I will add another example which I think is telling. Right now
there is an observation force on the border between Syria and
Israel. It has been there since the aftermath of the 1973 war. In-
deed, it has been an extraordinarily quiet border. But not because
of the presence of that force, but because it is in both states’ inter-
est to have it. If it is not in the interest of Assad to actually imple-

25

ment the key aspects of the Annan plan, which involve his transi-
tion, then the observers really won’t be able to do a whole lot.
Thank you.

Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Mr. Tabler, in your testimony you stat-
ed that, “Washington should immediately expand contingency plan-
ning about possible direct U.S. military support as part of actions
to head off massacres or humanitarian disaster. This includes sup-
porting the creation with allies such as Turkey, of safe havens in-
side Syria. In addition, the United States should consider what
kind of military force may be required and under what cir-
cumstances to assist the Syrian opposition in deposing the Assad
regime.” Ms. Karlin and Dr. Lynch also discussed this subject. As
I am sure you know, whether and how to aid the Syrian armed op-
position continues to be very contentious.

What assistance if any do you believe should be provided to the
armed opposition and under what circumstances? What do you be-
lieve are the risks and benefits of arming or training the armed op-
position, and additionally, are foreign nations providing aid to Syr-
ian rebels already, and if so, how should that factor into our deci-
sion making?

Mr. Tabler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To answer your ques-
tion, I think that the immediate first step is to expand the non-
lethal assistance to the armed opposition within Syria. And what
I mean by that is communications gear and other kinds of equip-
ment that will allow them to better communicate with each other
and coordinate their operations. I think that this is particularly the
smart move in light of the Assad regime’s failure thus far to imple-
ment the Annan plan.

There are risks to dealing with an opposition that you don’t
know. The opposition inside of Syria is headless. It is not
leaderless. There are many leaders. And the operations of the oppo-
sition within Syria are civil and armed and they vary by region.
And there are some regions where we are more familiar with the
groupings, particularly around Homs for the revolutionary councils
and in Daraa. Idlib province is a bigger concern. There are groups
there which are operating, which many perceive not to be in the
long-term interest of the United States. It is also a very confusing
environment.

But what I learned from my last visit to the Turkish-Syrian fron-
tier was that this assistance was already going across the border.
I have heard that there is more assistance going across the border.
A lot of this assistance by the way is not tunneled via States. It
is funneled via individuals. A lot of times, for example, weapons.
The armed opposition inside of Syria obviously is getting weapons
from somewhere. Where they are getting them from is, actually
Syrian officers are selling them to Turkish intermediaries who are
then selling them back to members of the opposition. And all this
requires is wealthy people coming up with some cash. There is
plenty of cash in the Middle East and it is already making its way
there. So that trend is established.

The question going forward is, given that there isn’t a resolution
to this — and I think Mara is right, I just don’t see how this settles
down anytime soon. Are we going to allow other countries in the
region who don’t share our long-term interests inside of Syria be

26

able to affect the outcome with the opposition? Or should the
United States get more directly involved? And I think the only way
to answer that is to take a much closer look at the groups that are
on the ground and determine who you can work with and who you
can’t. And I think to your original point, we should have done this
much earlier and we didn’t. We worked it from the top down when
we should have also, not instead of but also, been working it from
the bottom up.

Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you very much. My time is expired.
The gentleman from New York is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Ackerman. I found it interesting that the chairman invited
you to fight among yourselves and notody really rose to the bait,
which leads me to suspect that you are a lot closer to agreeing that
there is no clear solution to this problem, or am I wrong in that?

Ms. Karlin. Sir, I think you are probably right in that. Having
spent a lot of time wrestling with these issues, I think the three
of us are cognizant of how difficult and, as I noted, how
unsatisfying the options are. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t
choose one of those options, I think, as Mr. Chairman mentioned.
But I think we deeply appreciate we are now in the 13th month
of this conflict. Ten thousand people have been killed. It is hard not
to be rather sober about it.

Mr. Lynch. I would agree with that. Mr. Tabler, Ms. Karlin and
I, we see the same Syria and we see the same facts. I would say
that there are two, only two clear areas where I think that we seri-
ously disagree. I think the first is on the potential for the ceasefire
and the Annan plan to actually have a positive effect on events in-
side of Syria. And here, and actually even here I agree with much
of what was said. For example, I think that the observer mission
must be rushed in much more quickly. The French Foreign Min-
ister just proposed that all 300 should be on the ground within 15
days. That is something the United States should support strongly.
This should not be slow rolled. But if you look at what has hap-
pened in the areas where observers are currently located, violence
stops, and then they leave and violence starts again. And that is
the point of having an expanded mission on the ground in order to
make sure that they don’t have to leave and that you can actually
create that political space. So for the Annan plan I think we dis-
agree on the potential utility of that.

And the second, I think, very serious area of disagreement is on
the question of arming the free Syrian Army and the Syrian oppo-
sition, which quite frankly, I think, would actually lead to the
worst possible outcome in that it would stand up

Mr. Ackerman. You are for don’t arm them.

Mr. Lynch. I am very much for don’t arm. And the reason for
that is that by doing so what you do is you create a balance of
power on the ground in which the opposition is not going to be able
to win, but you will succeed in generating enough violence to scare
the other Syrians back into the arms of the regime and you end
up with a protracted insurgency. I look back in history and I try
and see examples of this strategy working. The only one I can find
is Afghanistan, mujahideen in Afghanistan. And how did that end
up? The Afghans stayed collapsed. The Taliban took power and al-
Qaeda was created. I can’t think of another example in modern his-

27

tory in which a strategy of arming the opposition, picking and
choosing who you can work with and trying to bring down an en-
trenched —

Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Tabler, do we arm the opposi-
tion?

Mr. Tabler. I think that we need to identify groups with whom
we could work and potentially arm some of those groups.

Mr. Ackerman. If we arm those groups what does that do? Does
that bring Assad down or does that guarantee that the U.N. peace-
observing mission has nothing to observe because there is no
peace?

Mr. Tabler. Well, they are observing the implementation of the
six-point plan. They are not observing peace or even are supposed
to keep the peace, so they can observe the agreement all they want
and make their own decisions.

Mr. Ackerman. Well, I don’t know. It seems sometimes that pol-
icymakers are more interested in checking the boxes. We have a
six-point plan, one, two, three, four, five, six. We don’t care what
the hell happens as long as that did whatever the plan said.

But if the ultimate goal here is to get rid of the Assad regime,
do you do that with arming the people? And if you arm the people,
it would seem to me that what Dr. Lynch said, you are going to
give the observers a lot more to observe. Because if you arm one
side more than they are armed, they are going to use those arms
because that is what they have the arms for.

Mr. Tabler. Right. We have the ability to arm the opposition in
greater numbers, but

Mr. Ackerman. Is it wise to do that is the question, and what
does that yield?

Mr. Tabler. They are going to get the weapons whether we give
them to them or not, and this is the problem. I mean there is

Mr. Ackerman. We don’t have to, we can move on to the next
country and call the next panel. Are you saying we shouldn’t do
anything because they are going to do it anyway, so we are wasting
a lot of time, resources

Mr. Tabler. I am saying to blanketly not support the armed op-
position inside of Syria would not be, I think that it is necessary
to do so in order to pressure the Assad regime. That does not mean
that we throw away the rest of our policy.

Mr. Ackerman. My concern is, when there is not a clear, every-
body can agree to want to go forward plan to a horrible situation
that is festering somewhere, that what we do on this side of the
table is we break down onto our own sides, and it becomes an exer-
cise in let us blame the administration or let us defend the admin-
istration. And our real concern has to be, on both sides of our ta-
bles here, is to figure out what we do as a humane people that is
in our national interest to resolve this situation the best and fast-
est way we can with the least damage to human beings and to the
greatest advantage to our American national interest. And we don’t
seem to have a clear path by which to accomplish that. Is that a
fair assessment? Forget about us bickering on this.

Ms. Karlin. Franldy, I don’t know that there is a clear and satis-
fying path. I will say this. To take off of Marc’s points, if we look
at some historical examples, there was really IV2 years of turmoil

28

and tumult including the positioning of observers in the Balkans
until Srebrenica happened, and that was the spectacular attack
that fomented the international communities’ involvement.

And I would also respectfully counter one of th points that Marc
had made regarding other scenarios where we have seen arming an
opposition, pushing out a government or rendering impotent. I
think if we look at Lebanon in the early 1980s, Iran’s efforts to
support the formation and strengthening of

Mr. Ackerman. I don’t know that that is a wise thing to do to
go back in history and find out who beat who and how they did it,
because someone will then come up with an observation that this
is a different country and it is a different century.

Ms. Karlin. Indeed, sir, indeed.

Mr. Ackerman. So while it might be historically interesting, we
are not going to make any policy decisions based on the Philistines
beat the Hebrews or something somewhere back in the

Mr. Chabot. The gentleman’s time has expired but if somebody
wanted to complete that thought that would be good.

Mr. Ackerman. That would not be me.

Mr. Chabot. Dr. Lynch, did you want

Mr. Lynch. Sir, if I may. I think that what unites the three of
us at the table is, and I think what actually meets your mandate
of us not simply bickering is that none of the three of us is urging
doing nothing. All of us would like to orient our policy to see that
Bashar al-Assad’s regime ends and the Syrian civilian population
is protected. Our disagreement, I think, is fundamentally about
what is the best way to do that. And I think that makes for a bet-
ter and more constructive kind of policy debate, and one which
hopefully can go forward.

Mr. Chabot. Okay, thank you very much. The gentleman’s time
has expired. The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr Fortenberry, is rec-
ognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses for coming today. I am sorry I don’t have the benefit of
your earlier testimonies since I arrived late, and if any of this is
redundant, please forgive me.

But I think the central question here is, what does a post-Assad
regime governance structure look like? What is the probability of
that actually happening? And then the third question is related to
an interesting scenario that I encountered on a radio call-in show
recently. It was a national program. A gentleman came on who was
American but of Syrian descent and who said that our policy ought
to be to defend Assad. He was a Christian, and because Assad pro-
tects the Christians that should be the United States policy, which
again begs the other question as to how he holds a coalition to-
gether that continues to empower him to provide some semblance
of governance structures in the midst of this chaos.

So everybody follow me on those three points?

Mr. Tabler. Congressman, we don’t know what a post-Assad
Syria would like yet. I can tell you based on what the country is
that it would be a very diverse one. A quarter of the population are
minorities, and the Sunni community, the 75 percent of the country
are divided between tribal Sunnis, settled tribal people, urbane
Sunnis from Aleppo and Damascus, and then more conservative

29

Muslim Sunnis from the northwestern part of the country in Idlib
province. It would look like a mosaic.

Mr. Fortenberry. Then the binding element currently, force and
fear? It has got to be a bit beyond that.

Mr. Tabler. In the past that is certainly how the Assad regime
has ruled over the country. I think a post-Assad Syria that would
not be necessary. I would imagine that you would see a country
that would have to come up with some kind of structure that would
be able to incorporate all those different communities into it.

But there is a tremendous amount of bickering inside of the op-
position. I think there are two distinctions here. One is, the exiled
opposition, the Syrian National Council, is incredibly divided and
they have had a lot of problems. One of the reasons is because they
are not facing any gunfire and they are not under pressure to come
together. They are arguing over chairs. And why would they argue
over chairs? Well, a lot of Western countries. Middle Eastern coun-
tries, and including in a de facto sense, the United States, only en-
gaged this Syrian National Council and they ignored the rest of the
opposition inside the country. So they have no incentive to come to-
gether until very recently.

The opposition inside the country has come together in some
areas, have coalesced more quickly in the face of live fire. There is
nothing that focuses the mind like being shot at. And I think that
that is a trend that we have seen in a number of different areas
including around Homs.

The reason why one of your perhaps constituents was argu-
ing —

Mr. Fortenberry. It wasn’t my constituent by the way.

Mr. Tabler. Oh, sorry.

Mr. Fortenberry. And I rejected the premise. The United States
is not going to stand by idly and watch this kind of brutality. It
is not who we are, and the times in which that has happened we
go back and question ourselves.

Mr. Tabler. Right.

Mr. Fortenberry. So I rejected his premise. But at the same
time it points to this idea of Assad being able to hold this coalition
together in some manner with some degree of authority, whether
that is legitimate authority or whether it is through fear and force
primarily.

Mr. Tabler. The Saudis call the way that President Assad rules
now, the killing machine. We call it Whac-A-Mole. It is very simple.
You send military forces into areas that you don’t control. You try
to clear them but you can’t hold them. And it drives up death tolls,
it drives refugees across the border.

Mr. Fortenberry. Well, it is unimaginable that he can sustain
this into time

Mr. Tabler. The Assad regime is

Mr. Fortenberry [continuing]. Given the state of the world and
the interconnectedness of the world, the resources that are
transnational that can flow to people who want to affect govern-
ance outcomes.

So back to the question. What does a post-Assad regime look
like?

30

Ms. Karlin. Thank you, sir. Let me make two points. A post-
Assad Syria is still violent. I think we can he cognizant of that. Be-
cause you have had an authoritarian structure really imposing it
to rule through violence and the potential for violence for decades,
we can expect violence to continue. Given its diversity there are a
couple models one could look at. One could look at Iraq or one
could look next door at Lebanon. Neither

Mr. Fortenberry. Is a Lebanese model multiple confessions,
government of multiple confessions viable?

Ms. Karlin. It would be difficult. I think in the near term it is
possible. The challenge with the Lebanese model is it doesn’t really
function very well. I mean you have a government that entirely im-
pedes all actions, so those are not heartening models. That said,
compared to authoritarian regimes

Mr. Fortenberry. It doesn’t function well, you are correct. But
somehow it functions.

Ms. Karlin. But somehow it does function.

Mr. Fortenberry. In the midst of the rise of sporadic chaos
somehow the mail gets delivered at the end of the day.

Ms. Karlin. It does, messily, to be sure. And it is even difficult
for the bureaucracies to move forward in any way in Lebanon, even
something as simple as ambassadorial confirmations. But that said,
they do exist and you don’t have the same degree of violence, for
example. And furthermore, in Lebanon you do have the challenge
of an extraordinarily powerful, armed nonstate actor of Hezbollah
helping govern it.

On the question that the individual asked you, it is an intriguing
one. Look, the straw man for why one would support Assad would
be that he had brought stability. And that is really what the ex-
change was. He was supporting terrorist groups, had a covert nu-
clear program, undermined the Arab-Israeli conflict, fomented in-
stability in Lebanon and Iraq, but at the end of the day Syria was
stable. That is really no longer the case, and I don’t know that any-
one really predicts that to be the case for the near to immediate
term. Thank you.

Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you.

Mr. Chabot. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you.

Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. We will move into a second
round here and I will yield myself 5 minutes. As the conflict in
Syria enters its second year, the prospect for a prolonged conflict,
I think many of us believe, has the potential of intensifying. If the
conflict in Syria evolves into a protracted battle between govern-
ment forces and an array of various Sunni militias, some analysts
fear that governance inside the country could erode significantly
and that the conflict could expand to other countries in the region.

Under what circumstances do you believe the conflict in Syria
could or would spread to, or draw other countries of the region into
this? And I will just go down the line beginning with you, Mr.
Tabler.

Mr. Tabler. It is possible that the conflict, such a conflict could
spread, but as we found out from Iraq and also a number of other
conflicts in the region, domino theories and contagions don’t often
hold true. I think Lebanon is particularly susceptible to some sort

31

of pressures from Syria, given that you have many of the same
communities that go over the border and the close history between
those two countries. But I think what is going on, actually in Leb-
anon the situation is rather quiet. Certainly is a lot hotter up in
the areas in the north where the refugees are coming across the
border. I think what is going on in Syria is a uniquely Syrian one.
It is a tempest.

Again, the prospects for the Assad regime reforming, in my opin-
ion based on my long experience there and particularly in the
knowledge of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, is close to zero. It is a mi-
nority-dominated regime like Saddam Hussein’s. I think the
chances of them splitting any time soon, I think it is going down
by the day. On the other hand you have this young opposition
carved out of what is essentially one of the youngest populations
in the Middle East. It is headless. I don’t see how this is politically
solved. Even if President Assad wanted to cut a deal tomorrow
with whom would he negotiate? And who would be able to take
people off the streets? That is the real challenges, and I think this
is one of the reasons why all three of us have been, and many oth-
ers, have been scratching our heads the last few months.

Mr. Chabot. Okay, thank you. Ms. Karlin?

Ms. Karlin. Thank you. In terms of the spread, I think there is
actually very real potential for it. And I look at Turkey as really
the center of gravity here. You many have seen the Turkish Prime
Minister’s recent comments where he had suggested that he may
ask NATO to invoke Article 5. We know the last time Article 5 was
invoked was following the September 11th attacks and really the
only time since then. That is a bold statement. It shows how
discomfitted he is by the actions of the regime in Syria and by the
slews of refugees and potential violence further plaguing the coun-
try. So it could be increased to be sure. Lebanon, frankly, is used
to

Mr. Chabot. I am sorry. Article 5 is the mutual defense?

Ms. Karlin. Yes, sir. And Lebanon is used to being regularly de-
stabilized by various regional events, and no doubt one would ex-
pect that to happen.

And then for a more creative option is really to look at Jordan.
For example, we saw slews of Iraqi refugees go to Jordan and dra-
matically shift the Jordanian economy because they came with a
lot of money. And so Jordanians couldn’t afford housing. That led
to some real difficulties for the Hashamites. So there is the violent
challenges, those that we are most aware of and the tangible ones,
and also the ones that are under the radar and indirect but actu-
ally have really problematic consequences. Thank you.

Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. And Dr. Lynch?

Mr. Lynch. Thank you, sir. I agree again with what my col-
leagues have said. I would also point to the potential impact on
Iraq, which as you know we spent a great deal of time, blood and
treasure trying to stabilize, and is uniquely vulnerable to a spill-
over given the long border and the history of cross-border relations
there.

There is also the potential for reverse impact where if you go
back to the 1950s, the last time you had a really unstable Syria,
it becomes a battleground for regional conflict, proxy war, between

32

in this case, the Gulf States and Iran basically becomes an arena
in which they fight their battles. And that historically is something
which was very destabilizing for Syria and across the region. And
it becomes an extremely useful place for a group like al-Qaeda,
which is mostly on the ropes, to reconstitute itself To project itself
as the defender of embattled Sunnis in Syria, this could possibly
be its only opportunity to reestablish itself as a meaningful force
in Arab politics. It has not done so to this point. I think that much
of what we have seen is propaganda from Bashar’s regime, but
looking ahead is something which any serious strategic assessment
has to take into effect.

The final part of my answer to your question and to Representa-
tive Fortenberry’s question is that much depends on how violent
the transition process is. An extended, turbulent, violent transition
process is more likely to create both a violent, unstable situation
inside of Syria and across the region. And I think that is the great
concern of the Turks in particular as they try and find a solution.

Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. And the gentleman from
New York is recognized for a second round, if you want to go. We
are into the second round so I can go. All right, go ahead, Mr.
Connolly. We will go to the gentleman from the Commonwealth of
Virginia. Not the State, but the Commonwealth.

Mr. Connolly. That is right. Can anyone name the four Com-
monwealths in the United States? There are only four.

Mr. Chabot. Kentucky.

Mr. Connolly. Kentucky, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Vir-
ginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Ackerman,
for your graciousness.

Ms. Karlin, you talked about Turkey. There have been some al-
leged encroachments, shooting across the border, targeting some
refugees perhaps even. How helpful has Turkey been during the
Syrian crisis from the U.S. point of view, would you say?

Ms. Karlin. Thank you, sir. The Turks as you may know had a
very close relationship with the Assad regime for a number of
years. In fact, this was how Prime Minister Erdogan really showed
his comparative advantage, was that he believed and he articulated
that he could bring the Syrians in for a close relationship with not
just the U.S. but also with the Israelis. You might recall he had
tried to broker an Israeli-Syrian peace deal. So that relationship
was critical for the Turks, and that is why for the first few months
of this conflict we saw the Turkish leadership, both the Foreign
Minister and the Prime Minister, very enthusiastically trying to
work with Assad to reform. And then they realized he wasn’t going
to, and they were scorned and they were perturbed.

And since then I would say they have actually been quite helpful.
They have welcomed in the refugees. They have supported them as
much as possible. In fact, in many ways you could probably say the
Turks have been more forward-leaning than a lot of other states,
the United States, and also in Western Europe, because they are
perturbed by what he has done. They are particularly perturbed
that Assad lied to them. They thought he had this potential and
he clearly didn’t. They are now feeling the direct effects of the tur-
moil in Syria, and it is why, I think, they are the most worried
about this dynamism in the contours of what really plays out. So

33

I think they can he a close ally here, hut I do believe they are going
to look for what role the U.S. is willing to play in support of them.

Mr. Connolly. Did you want to comment, Dr. Lynch?

Mr. Lynch. I would just add that when you look at Turkey, the
Kurdish issue, the roles

Mr. Connolly. I was just going to ask about the Kurds. Go
ahead.

Mr. Lynch. There you are. They are obsessed and have a deep
problem with their own Kurds, and that leads them to be highly
skeptical of any post-Assad situation in Syria in which the Kurds
enjoy autonomy or any form of seemingly

Mr. Connolly. Although correct me if I am wrong. In Syria the
Kurds have been relatively quiescent compared to say Iraq or even
for that matter, Turkey.

Mr. Lynch. For the Turks this is matter of great concern. The
rationality or the history is not something which is necessarily
guiding their decision making in that regard. But I would say that
with the Kurds, and I would say even more broadly, again in re-
sponse to Mr. Fortenberry’s question, is that the Syrian opposition
has not done a good job to this point of trying to reassure commu-
nities like the Kurds, the Christians, the Alawis. And if there is
going to be any hope of a stable or nonviolent transition, they need
to do a much better job of guaranteeing the security and the inclu-
sion and participation of such minority communities.

Mr. Connolly. And you bring up a very good point. The Assad
regime has been a minority Alawite regime since its founding. The
Alawites are in some quarters of the Islamic world considered
worse than heretics, even nonbelievers. And I don’t judge that but
they have got a problem in mainstream Islam in terms of accept-
ance. One could look at what is going on in Syria and differentiate
it from Libya or some other situations and say, well, for the
Alawites this is do or die. If they lose power there are a lot of other
problems besides just the fall of a regime, from their point of view.

How much of a dynamic do you think that represents and how
if at all, you talked about reach out and reassure the Alawites.
Well, that sounds good, but I mean given the dynamic and given
the current power structure that has been in place for quite some
time, that is a lot easier said than done. Any of you can comment.

Mr. Tabler. The minority nature of the regime galvanizes it
against the kind of splits like we saw in Egypt and Tunisia. A split
meaning, for the military, acts as a and ousts the ruling family in
the name of the nation. Because the idea is that if the Assad family
is thrown out that along with it go the prospects of the Alawites.
I think that that is a real barrier. It makes this regime much more
rigid.

And the reason why the Obama administration has tried to work
with Russia in this regard is not because of any kind of love for
Russia, but rather it is based on an assumption, an uncertain one,
that the Russians have assets inside of the Syrian military which
will be able to be called upon later to convince the generals in that
country, despite the fact they are Alawites, to expel the Assad fam-
ily. I think there have been a number of conversations in this re-
gard. But thus far it seems that the Russians are not willing to go
along with it. Either it is based on their own calculations in the

34

region or, and there are others that speculate, that it is based on
their own conversations with the Alawite generals themselves that
they realize that the regime can hold on for some time. And that
makes this a particularly difficult problem to solve diplomatically
involving Russia.

Mr. Chabot. Okay, the gentleman’s time has expired. Did you
want to make a comment. Dr. Lynch?

Mr. Lynch. Yes, very briefly. I do not believe that the sectarian
dimension is the most important here in the sense of Sunni-Shia
conflict or of the Alawites being heterodox. I think for mainstream
Sunnis this is not a major issue. It is a major issue for Salafi
jihadists of the al-Qaeda variety who are as you say deeply hostile
to any form of Shiaism and including Alawis. But I think that the
real risk is that this can increasingly become something which de-
fines relations as the conflict progresses, as we saw in Iraq where
you did not have a great deal of sectarian tension early on, but as
the killing proceeded the battle lines and the identity lines became
harder and harder. And even intermarriage and living in close
quarters wasn’t enough to protect people from that sectarian dif-
ferentiation.

Mr. Chabot. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman
from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry, is recognized for 5 minutes in the
second round.

Mr. Fortenberry. What are your thoughts as a panel on
leveraging military assets by a coalition of nations to create space
for humanitarian relief and space for the development of a new and
just and legitimate form of governance for Syria?

Mr. Tabler. Working inside of such a coalition for the creation
of where there would be safe havens, buffer zones, humanitarian
corridors, there are a variety of concepts, is something which there
are contingency plans for this together with Turkey which have
been developed by multiple sides. It is certainly doable. It presents
a number of challenges militarily. That would allow a space where
refugees could run as the game of Whac-A-Mole continues.

But also, and the Syrian opposition has argued this, that this
would create a space also politically inside the country where peo-
ple would be able to go and organize and essentially have a
Benghazi. It is unclear if immediately that would happen. It cer-
tainly would have a political effect inside the country. It certainly
would be a major loss for President Assad to lose control over areas
of his country. It would depend on though how it was carved out,
if simply Turkey invaded to prevent refugees coming across.

Where this problem intersects with the Kurdish problem is that
every time there is a game of Whac-A-Mole people die, people go
across the border into that group. And this is what the Turks are
worried about now. Turkey is worried that the PYD, the Syrian
version of the PKK, which they consider a terrorist organization,
that members in Syria now are acting as police in the Kurdish
communities. They could then melt into these refugees going across
the border, and that is a national security threat to Turkey. It is
one of the reasons why Article 5 could be invoked. And so that is
one of the reasons why Turkey would intervene.

But there is also a possibility that areas like in Eastern Syria
where the tribes are dominant could also break away. And that

35

would function also politically. In Eastern Syria particularly you
have serious production of oil and natural gas. So that would very
quickly constrain the regime’s ability to refine gasoline and diesel
fuel as well as the production of natural gas which fires most of
their power plants.

Ms. Karlin. Let me just quickly add, sir, the creation of such
areas would no doubt be a turning point, and I think Andrew nice-
ly delineated what some of those might look like. There are of
course challenges inherent in what those areas do, to be sure, but
I think it is important that we are cognizant no matter what termi-
nology we use. Those areas generally will look pretty similar
whether they are safe havens, support havens, no-fly zones, you
name it. They will all at least within the Assad regime’s eyes be
seen as the same. And that is important to be cognizant of. Wheth-
er or not we should actually establish them or support others doing
them is a separate issue. But I think from the Assad regime’s per-
spective this is all the same. Thank you.

Mr. Lynch. So without running afoul of the ranking member’s
warnings about history, let me say that history is fairly clear that
safe zones don’t work. That the safe zones don’t work. That either
they require an enormous amount of diplomatic and military effort
to sustain, or else they become in a sense unfunded mandates in
which you offer guarantees of protection which you are not able to
deliver, then you end up with your Srebrenicas.

And so I think that it could be a turning point, but likely a turn-
ing point to deeper involvement. In order to establish a safe zone,
for the United States with the way its military works, you would
need to first establish a no-fly zone. That requires heavy bombing
often in urban areas.

Mr. Fortenberry. Let me be clear. I didn’t say the United
States.

Mr. Lynch. Well, whoever does it. I mean I think no military is
going to be willing to act in these areas without having the military
ability to do so safely. And so basically this is something which
sounds easy, but actually it is quite difficult when you look at what
it actually entails. And then once you have done it you then have
to maintain it. If you look at the example of in 1991 we declare Op-
eration Provide Comfort and we spent the next 12 years protecting
the Kurdish north, and that did not lead to a cascade of Saddam
falling. We also declared a no-fly zone in the south to protect the
Shia and that didn’t work at all. And in fact, so you can go back
and you look at those examples.

I would say that whatever happens, it has to be done with the
mandate of the United Nations and with international legitimacy.
NATO, I think, cannot do this on its own. It doesn’t matter if the
Arab League supports it. Those are useful steps toward getting a
Security Council resolution, but acting without the Security Coun-
cil would make this something destructive of international laws
and norms rather than building respect for international law. And
I think for this administration or for any administration, this
would be an extremely dangerous step to take.

Mr. Chabot. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman
from New York is recognized for 5 minutes.

36

Mr. Ackerman. I think there is a certain amount of international
naivete spearheaded by American and Western notions of democ-
racy, that somehow we will settle this all down by having some
kind of big general election and evep^body is going to peacefully
abide by whatever the results are, which is something we can hard-
ly do in this country anymore let alone expect it to happen in a
place where you have such sectarian and other kinds of interest.
This is going to require, I think, taking a close look at what Rus-
sian expectations are, how to get the Russians on board so that
they can resolve the issues that are very important and critical to
them, and other countries as well. I will put that out there for any-
body who wants to comment on it.

But in specific, looking at the major players who can have an in-
fluence or an effect on the resolution of this problem, which coun-
tries are the most critical of the Obama administration or Amer-
ican interests, if I could defang the question as I started to propose
it, and apply the Goldilocks litmus test of the porridge being too
hot or too cold, or who thinks we are getting it just right? Do we
have critics that are not on board because of what we are doing,
and who are vocal of what they think we should or should not be
doing?

Mr. Lynch. Let me start that. I think that Saudi Arabia and
Qatar have been very vocal in wanting us to take a firmer line. It
reminds me of an old line that we once heard from Secretary Gates
that they want to fight Syria with the last American.

Mr. Ackerman. I wrote that down before you said it.

Mr. Lynch. Yes, it is right there for you.

Mr. Ackerman. So they are not sending any of their citizens.

Mr. Lynch. Exactly.

Mr. Ackerman. They are holding our coat and wishing us the
best in the fight.

Mr. Lynch. Exactly. I think that Russia, I think, Andrew has al-
ready spoken of quite effectively. I would only point out two things
here. The first is that a lot of Annan strategy, Kofi Annan strategy,
is built around trying to hold the Russians here, which is to say
that this is a plan to which they have agreed. It is their ideas, and
in a sense they then take on a certain responsibility to deliver.

The second point I would make is that everybody tends to equate
Russia and China but, in fact, their interests in this are quite dif-
ferent. China has no interest to speak of in Syria. It has a great
deal of interest in the energy of the Gulf, and they are much more
likely to be responsive to Saudi Arabia and Qatar in terms of pres-
sure on them to shift their position. And so I would not speak of
Russia and China as a unified bloc. They have different interests
and they might behave differently. You have already seen signs of
that in New York at the Security Council.

Mr. Ackerman. What is your view of their attitude toward what
we are doing?

Mr. Lynch. I think for China, simply standing up to the United
States at the moment is something which is useful for them politi-
cally given their grievances and things happening in Asia, but they
have no intrinsic interest in Syria in the way that Russia does. And
as a straightforward realpolitik, which is how I think the Chinese
approach the world, it is much more important for them to keep

37

the energy producers of the Gulf happy than it is for them to keep
Syria or Russia happy.

Mr. Fortenberry [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired.
So let us

Mr. Ackerman. I want to appeal for the judges. I think the clock
was running from the last time, right?

Mr. Fortenberry. It is confusing to me too.

Mr. Ackerman. Did I go 8V2 minutes?

Mr. Fortenberry. It didn’t seem that long, but it is always in-
teresting to listen to you and time flies by. But don’t know what
the time was.

Mr. Ackerman. I take that as the ultimate compliment.

Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, if I may. The clock kind of went
the opposite direction.

Mr. Fortenberry. Is that what happened.

Mr. Connolly. And I believe the gentleman had

Mr. Fortenberry. Well, I didn’t want to lose my legitimacy of
authority in the chair here, so I apologize if I cut you off pre-
maturely.

Mr. Ackerman. No, I will abide by the decision of the chair.

Mr. Fortenberry. Well, why don’t we do this? The chairman is
back and I will return the gavel to him.

Mr. Connolly. I would ask you now to consent that the gen-
tleman from New York be granted an additional minute.

Mr. Ackerman. I would rephrase that and say my remaining
minute.

Mr. Connolly. Your remaining minute.

Mr. Ackerman. I would just like to hear the response of the
panel to try to get their, what I was trying to elicit, Mr. Chairman.
It was not the fault of the gentleman who was in the chair, but the
clock went haywire and reversed itself.

Mr. Chabot. Are you using your minute right now?

Mr. Ackerman. Only if you think so. I was trying to elicit from
the distinguished panel what they thought of the assessment of
other countries viewing whatever our policy is, as whether we are
being too harsh or not harsh enough.

Mr. Chabot. Okay, very good.

Ms. Karlin. Sir, I would just add, I think Marc did a nice job
of delineating those in the Middle East who are frustrated by our
policy. I would be sure to add to that the Turks who I think have
looked for very strong signals from the United States and have not
received them. And on the Russia point, it is one worth considering
in that the Russians have a lot to lose if the Assad regime goes,
and very little to gain at this stage. They lose money. They lose a
lot in arms sales. They lose access to their only port out of what
had been the Soviet Union’s territory. And for them to just do a
little to impede change in Syria delivers a lot.

They perturb the United States no doubt. They really by them-
selves accede at the table. When we talk about the Annan plan, so
much of the discussion is, well, what are the Russians going to do
about it? That is really where the focus is. So for the Russians, and
of course if we look at what has happened in the region in the last
IV2 years and the massive losses that they found in Libya given

38

the change in administrations there, they are not enthusiastic
about seeing a new Syria.

On the China piece, I would just add to Marc’s comments. The
Chinese are notoriously uncomfortable when other states look at
domestic politics, when they look at what is happening internally
and how a state treats its population. For decades, the United
States focused on Syria’s foreign policy, what it was doing outside
of its borders. And now really for the first time in a long time we
are looking inside, and that is not something that the Chinese are
inherently comfortable with. Thank you.

Mr. Chabot. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman
from the Commonwealth of Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair. And something that you said.
Dr. Lynch, intrigued me. You said safe zones don’t work. Surely
that is an arguable point. There are a lot of people who believe the
safe zone, if you can call it that in Iraq, for at least Kurds, did
work, which is why that part of the country even to this day is
prospering and growing and attracting investment and so forth. We
actually kind of cordoned it off and helped protect it from Saddam
Hussein at the time. I may take your point on the south, but
wouldn’t you agree that at least an arguable case could be made
that it worked in the north?

Mr. Lynch. Yes, it could. But the cost was about 20,000 deployed
troops, and it consumed an enormous amount of America’s diplo-
matic attention to maintain authorization for that at the Security
Council over the years. And midway through, in 1996, one of the
Kurdish political parties invited Saddam Hussein’s troops in to
come and help finish off his political rival, and our no-fly zone was
unable to prevent that. And so it was a guarded success at very
high cost. But my point would be that what it did not do was what
many people claim a safe area in Syria would do, which is to create
a space where an alternative Iraqi leadership could emerge and
thrive. Efforts to do that by the Iraqi National Congress failed
rather spectacularly and it did not create a rallying point, which
then led to a domino effect throughout the — so in other words, yes,
it was a limited success in protecting the Kurds in a geographically
concentrated space with almost complete ethnic homogeneity

Mr. Connolly. Yes. And I thought that was maybe the broader
point you were making which is, Syria is not Iraq. I mean it is
much more Balkanized, much more difficult to find a safe zone to
say, well, that is going to be the safe zone, and we have three dis-
tinct, although there was lots of intermingling, but three distinct
areas in Iraq that we could have, we pointed to.

Mr. Tabler, did you want to comment on that?

Mr. Tabler. I think that the idea of safe zones, yes, they are
problematic. Yes, they are sort of a half measure so to speak be-
tween a overwhelming direct military intervention to sort of rip out
the disease itself And I would expect that these solutions, a safe
zone or some of these other solutions are not perfect ones, but they
are ones that are probably going to be considered, and I know are
very seriously being considered b^y Turkey, as ways to try and man-
age the conflict as it goes forward.

So then the question becomes, should the United States con-
tribute to an effort now to deal with this problem and what it

39

should be, or do we just wait and let this go on for 10 years which
some estimates in this town indicate. And just see where it goes
and allow other people to, and including our allies, to try and affect
its outcome. I think this would be easier to solve if I could really
clearly see what the solution politically would be, and I just can’t
see it. I don’t know anyone that really knows the country or
knows

Mr. Connolly. That is my final question for all of you. Revolu-
tions always start off better than they usually end. And yet looking
at today’s Egypt and Libya I would say the jury is out. What have
we produced, collectively, not just the — and so as we look at Syria
there are reports just this week that perhaps there has been some
infiltration by extremist elements, terrorist elements, trying to ex-
ploit the situation.

What ought to be, what could be a likely result given the experi-
ence we have just had with the Arab Spring and given what we
know about Syria and its differences with other Arab countries?

Mr. Tabler. The Assad regime is already destabilized and it will
continue to deteriorate one way or the other. And into that very
volatile vacuum can step other parties, for sure, and it can suck in
a lot of other countries in the region and it can draw in a lot of
other countries including the United States as well. The ultimate
outcome, the settlement of the Syrian revolution is unclear.

But what I can tell you is this. Whether America does something
or not this is going to continue. This is not going to settle down
any time soon. I don’t know anyone I have met in the region who
thought so, and we really need to be able to look at this as a storm
and how are we going to deal with it. This is a bit different than
a tornado. A tornado, you just have to let it blow through. In this
particular case there are some things we can do, the question is
now, what?

Ms. Karlin. Sir, I would just add to that. It is hard to know
when a revolution really ends. When we look at Egypt, for example,
there are large swaths of the population that still think the country
is in revolution. And yet there are those, particularly amongst the
more conservative elements, that see the revolution as over. They
have succeeded. They are in power, and moving on. And so I think
that is a dilemma that we will see in Syria also. It is one we saw
in Iran during that revolution also, if you will excuse me for citing
history again, sir.

So the results, what we know is this will be messy and we know
that the violence will continue. It will be difficult. It will probably
embroil various members of the region. And ideally the IJ.S. will
be able to help shape how it plays out to a degree. But it is not
stopping. I think we are all probably in quite a violent agreement
about that. Thank you.

Mr. Lynch. And even though we are over time, I would simply
say that I agree with Andrew that this is likely to continue for
quite some time. And again, if you see what the ceasefire did in
the 2 weeks since it has come into effect, each Friday you have
seen a qualitative jump in the number of peaceful demonstrations.
And the fundamental question is whether that is enough to develop
into the sort of tide of peaceful protest which could pose genuine
problems for the regime. I think that Andrew’s sense is that if that

40

begins to happen the guns will come back out in much more force,
which is precisely the point at which we need a united inter-
national community ready to put serious pressure on Assad to stop
that from happening. That is why I want the observer mission to
move in much more quickly, why it is so important to keep inter-
national consensus to the U.N. and why we need to push that for-
ward.

Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chabot. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman’s time has
expired. I want to thank the members of the panel for their excel-
lent testimony.

Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Chabot. Yes.

Mr. Ackerman. If I might before you conclude. Just for the
record, I didn’t mean to disparage all of history.

Mr. Chabot. It is too late now.

Mr. Ackerman. But just to try to reclaim my honor.

Mr. Chabot. It is okay, you are retiring anyway.

Mr. Ackerman. I just wanted to caution us that we are not al-
ways informed by events in third century Babylonia as to what to
do in 21st century Afghanistan.

Mr. Chabot. Excellent. Okay, thank you very much. And we
want to thank the very fine presentation by the panel this after-
noon. I think it was excellent testimony. And without objection,
members will have 5 legislative days to submit questions or supple-
ment their statements. And if there is no further business to come
before the committee, we are adjourned. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 2:59 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

(41)

42

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

as. HOUSE OU RUFRKSKNTA TIVRS
WASHINCtTON, D.C.

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
Steve Chabot (R-OH), Chairman

April 23, 2012

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and
South Asia, to be held in Room 2360 (Small Business Committee Room) of the Rayburn House Office
Building taiid available live via the Committee website at httD://www.hcfa.house.govl :

DATE:

TIME:

SUBJECT:

WITNESSES:

Wednesday, April 25, 2012
1:30 p.m.

Confronting Damascus: U S. Policy Toward the Evolving Situation in Syria, Part U

Mr. Andrew Tabler

Next Generation Fellow

Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Ms. MaraE, Karlin
Instructor in Strategic Studies
School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University

Marc Lynch, Ph D.

Professor of Political Science
Director of Institute for Middle East Studies
Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University

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